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What is important in the present context, however, is that simple foreknowledge, foreknowledge without middle knowledge, is not sufficient to enable
God to be perfectly provident. Indeed, I claim to have shown that simple
foreknowledge is of no use whatever for the doctrine of providence. 8 Simple
foreknowledge provides God with knowledge of what will actually occur,
but this knowledge, which is subsequent to God's own decision about what
he will himself do, cannot then be used to guide that decision. And thus we
obtain an important result: Those who wish to combine a libertarian conception of free will with a strong doctrine of providence must embrace middle
knowledge. Those who affirm simple foreknowledge but deny middle knowledge are very likely to find themselves with a doctrine of foreknowledge
which is theologically useless.
Freddoso's work on Molina is indispensable. It is an outstanding contribution to the literature on divine foreknowledge, and by far the best thing
produced to date on middle knowledge. Those who work on either of these
topics will overlook it to their own great loss.
NOTES
1. See, ~Foreknowledge and Necessity," Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985), pp. 121-57;
~A

Refutation of Middle Knowledge," Nous 20 (1986), pp. 545-57; and God, Time, and
Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), Chapters 2 and 4-7.
2. Alfred I. Freddoso, ~Accidental Necessity and Logical Detenninism," Journal of
Philosophy 80 (1983), pp. 257-78.
3. See Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), p.
123.
4. Strictly speaking, what is new here is that accidental necessity is not closed under
entailmentfor contingent propositions; on Freddoso's explication, necessary propositions
cannot in any case be accidentally necessary.
5. See, MForeknowledge and Necessity," pp. 142-44, and God, Time, and Knowledge,
pp.104-15.
6. This point is argued in God. Time, and Knowledge, pp. 32-35.
7. Personal communication.
8. See, God, Time. and Knowledge, Chapter 3.

The Reality of Time and The Existence of God, by David Braine. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1988. Pp. XVI, 383. Cloth.
DAVID BURRELL, C.S.C., University of Notre Dame.
In a challenging and penetrating inquiry, this philosopher from Aberdeen
develops a sustained argument whereby the world in which we live assumes
its rightfully primary place, and it is this world's continuing into the future
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which provides the impetus for his proof that God exists. Josef Pieper once
remarked that the "hidden element in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas" is
the fact of creation. Braine may be seen to be elucidating that remark by
making explicit the connections between key assertions of Aquinas' synthesis: the eternity of God and the reality of time, the centrality of a real distinction between essence and esse, such that the resulting composition of
creatures demands a simple (or incomposite) cause of their existence, leading
to a relation of creator to creation of such immediacy that all temptation to
deism is removed "when, in one move, we at once mark the unlikeness in
God's way of existing from the way creatures exist and mark this immediacy"
(20).

My reference to Aquinas is intended as an orientation; one should not be
misled into labelling Braine's effort as "Thomist," for the arguments he gives
are his own, exhibiting a sophisticated grasp of key elements in philosophy
of science, as well as logic and semantics. Yet he manages to catch thereby
the heart of Aquinas' affirmation of a temporal world freely created by an
eternal God, showing just how wrongheaded it is to caricature Aquinas'
articulation as "classical theism"-Le., an irreligious substitution of philosophical categories for the fresh perspectives of revelation, and therefore a
position which must be overcome, on theological if not philosophical
grounds. Quite the contrary, Braine argues: unless some such articulation of
creation in relation to its creator is allowed to inform one's theological inquiry, the delicate harmony between free creatures and a sovereign God is
bound to be jeopardized-as the history of theology amply demonstrates. In
fact, one of the strongest recommendations of Braine's study is his knowledgeable sensitivity to theological issues throughout, particularly in his recurrent application of logical and semantic results to Trinitarian doctrine. One
might also see his resolute upholding of the primacy of "first order" philosophical results and the world of existing substances as reflecting a similar
theological sensitivity: the only world we know is the one in which we and
other things subsist; other "worlds" are conceptually parasitic on this one,
the one which God creates and sustains.
The focus implies the "reality of time": while substances exist in a causal
matrix wherein their activity is causally displayed, the now of existence and
activity (which he dubs the "dramatic now" [47]) itself provides no reason
for their continuing in existence. Such a claim does not entail "occasionalism," though it indicates why theists bereft of the conceptual tools needed to
distinguish existing from essence might feel constrained to evacuate natural
causal efficacy in the face of a sovereign creator. For Braine, as for Aquinas,
natures reliably continue yet their actual continuance requires a non-temporal
cause of their existing (340). Such is the nub of his proof that a first cause
of the universe must exist, so the early chapters are spent securing a viable
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notion of temporal existence, and the latter chapters enhancing the notion of
first cause of existence so that it can be recognizable to Jews, Christians, and
Muslims as their God. And throughout, his astute methodological comments
keep reminding the reader how doing philosophy of religion requires a clear
perspective on and accurate use of many subdisciplines of philosophy.
God's eternity and the "dramatic now" of temporal existence will be seen
to complement one another once one assumes a resolutely (Aristotelian) "first
order" philosophical stance, wherein existing things exhibit their activity via
causal efficacy. And the activity stems from their actual existing, which must
itself flow from an eternal cause, where 'eternal' means more than 'nontemporal' since what makes God eternal is the very identity of God's essence
with existence, such that God alone is in full possession of life and so can
properly be said to be the cause of everything's existing (351). The result,
then, is a creator, free because eminently personal (Ch. IX), yet "purged ... of
the implications of 'individuality' to which Hindu and Buddhist rightly object" (370) by a "metaphysical perspective which ... considers the conditions
of temporal existence itself, and not the conditions of rational thinking, as
internal to any proper theology" (338).
That same perspective "secures the rejection of deistic, 'strong predestinationist,' and Platonic models of eternity and personhood" (333) by
adopting the "via negativa [which insists] that God should be differently
related to his effects than any other possible cause to its effects and that He
should possess His nature in a different way from any other possible being"
(353)-i.e., simply and identically. Joined to a non-dualist account of action,
this means that "the eternal God .. .is at one and the same time the one whose
breath (spirit, pneuma, or ruah) enlivens, energizes, and gives vigor and
existence to all things, immediate within them" (357)-since "the agent does
what happens [in such away] that the time of the doing is the time of the
happening so that God's acting will not be in eternity but in time" (135),
since "what is done by God is the existing and the continued existing of things
that exist" (20). Moreover, this immediacy of God's presence to creation, tied
as it is to the reality of time, nicely finesses "foreknowledge" questions, since
whatever does not exist cannot be present to a knower either. The need to
attribute such a knowledge to God at once betrays a category mistake (re.
time/eternity) as well as places both creator and creature in a theological bind,
as we shall see.
Braine's arguments are designed explicitly to culminate in a creator: not a
demiurge, which he implies is the furthest one can reach with a "platonist"
or rationalist perspective, which elevates conceptual possibilities above the
actuality of existing things; nor a sovereign being conceived "alongside" the
world in which we live, "imagined as if He made plans and acted in the
manner of a finite person" (327). With such a one, "we seem to be forced
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into a choice between 'strong predestination ism ' and a coeval interdependent
demiurge." So the metaphysical efforts to think an incomposite (or simple)
being, whose uniqueness is rooted in that negative first-level assertion (16873), and to do so from an analysis of existing things which leads one to
recognize their existential composition, promises a rich theological payoff.
Yet here one must attend to Braine's explicit "contrast between a rationalist
metaphysics attempting to build ... on certain univocal general principles
bestraddling all subject-matters uniformly and an Aristotelian metaphysics
utilizing structurally interrelated sets of analogous concepts" (210). What is
at stake here is a crucial difference in the way one approaches human knowledge of generality: is it "exhibited primarily in judgements about particular
cases" (257), and so "realized in a spread of analogous applications of
principle" or is it expressed "in some single univocal principle" (262)?
Braine, with Aquinas (213-19) and Wittgenstein, comes down decisively for
the first, while "platonists," who play the lasting foil for his sustained argument, line up with Scotus and Leibniz (263) on the other side, carrying with
them (I would suggest) all too many graduate students who are introduced
into professional philosophy by way of -isms rather than by way of examples
and careful consideration of the context and point of diverse philosophical
arguments. In that respect, Braine's manner of proceeding, rigorous as it is,
asks more than following its tight reasoning; or rather, the upshot of allowing
oneself to follow the arguments will be a challenge to settled perspectives
about philosophical argument itself. That is, I take it, the import of his
insistence on the primacy of first-order over second-order considerations
(225n.), and of an "a posteriori approach which considers the conditions of
temporal existence" (378) over various a priori approaches associated with
"platonism" and identified with Scotus. Braine shows better than anyone I
know just how crucial such a difference is for philosophical theology, and
since that difference cuts so deep, just how relevant other parts of philosophy
are to executing a philosophy of religion which will be adequate to the
demands of a theology faithful to the newness of Christian revelation-to say
nothing of the newness of Jewish or Muslim faith as well.

Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age, by
Sallie McFague. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987. Pp. xv and 224.
JOSEPH RUNZO, Claremont Graduate School and
Chapman College, California.
This is an important book. Addressing some of the most trenchant, current
issues in philosophical theology, it offers an articulate and interesting exposition of "metaphorical theology" which not only challenges traditional theo-

